

## **Brownfield Redevelopment for Community Regeneration: Preserving Neighborhoods and Avoiding Displacement**

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Brownfield redevelopment has become a common concern of local governments across the US over the past decade. Both the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), attempting to mitigate environmental threats and state economic development officials pursuing sites to offer new businesses, and employers have promoted reclamation and re-use of abandoned or underutilized and potentially contaminated properties. The most immediate returns on remediation and redevelopment of brownfield sites, however, are experienced by local governments, which garner new tax revenues and may be able to remove tax delinquent sites off their own property rolls (Meyer and VanLandingham 2000).

This paper explores how area-wide neighborhood regeneration may be linked to brownfield redevelopment in ways that benefit both the local municipality and the communities that have “hosted” brownfield sites. We don’t focus on the environmental justice issue as a primary concern, nor does our discussion presume an inherent capacity to address the brownfield issue on the part of community-based organizations. (Leigh, 2000, effectively demonstrates the constraints on most of those entities and their limited vision when it comes to contaminated land issues.) Rather, we look at local initiatives and solutions beyond those that community-based organizations can employ by themselves – those involving municipal collaboration with neighborhoods and CBOs.

In particular, we focus on the issue of the off-site impacts of on-site responses. There is an extensive literature on gentrification and displacement that sets the framework for an examination of the effects on current residents and local property owners. The presence of past pollution and the future risks associated with alternative contamination risk management approaches generates a further set of issues in predicting and addressing the processes of brownfield redevelopment for community regeneration.

Our analysis is inherently preliminary, since our data are drawn from case study analysis of brownfield redevelopment efforts in different settings in the US that is ongoing with financing from EPA’s brownfields office.<sup>1</sup> Data collection has been under way since August, 2006, and

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will continue into 2008. This paper highlights some innovations and insights from the ongoing projects and is intended to stimulate discussion about the replicability of the experiences and their implications for other brownfield efforts around the country.

Section I below introduces the key risk management/cost minimization approach now shaping brownfield responses, Risk-Based Corrective Action (REBCA) and its immediate consequences. Section II moves on to the analytical approach undertaken and the specific research questions being probed. In Section III, we identify the case study loci and discuss the specific rationales for the selection of the individual projects or settings as objects of study, the lessons we attempted to learn from them, and derive some preliminary findings from each. In Section IV we begin with some general preliminary findings on risk from the individual cases and then turn to issues of replicability of findings in larger cities. We conclude with some preliminary and speculative results on the specific issue of gentrification threats in Section V.

- I -

As the market for new development in central cities has expanded, which the evidence suggests it has for myriad reasons, cities have rushed to promote redevelopment (NALGEP and NEMWI 2004). Their actions, however, are driven by maximizing benefits to their constituents as a whole, not the protection of specific exposed populations or simply the revitalization of depressed neighborhoods (McCarthy 2002). Moreover, public sector redevelopment decisions replicate the private sector logic of examining a site by itself, and not the off-site impacts that utilization of the property may generate (Wernstedt, *et al.* 2006). Some exceptions to this tendency exist, as De Sousa (2004), among others, has documented for the creation of public spaces out of old brownfields. However, the reality remains that many new brownfield developments present unavoidable immediate or longer term risks to the populations and property owners in their immediate neighborhoods through their reliance on Risk-Based Corrective Action (RBCA) that leaves contaminants on site (Wernstedt, *et al.* 2007).

Admittedly, the prior pollution is the root source of the risk: past practices that did not concern themselves with wastes (and toxic materials used in production) left on site have produced a legacy of dangers that cannot be fully known through any level of testing. Current standards for “All Appropriate Inquiry” (AAI) promulgated by the US EPA and for the engineering protocols to be used in identifying on-site contaminants that may have to be addressed are intended to limit the uncertainty and thus risk. However, they cannot be 100% accurate, so *any* reuse poses the risk that the site remediation process failed to address an undetermined or undiscovered danger due to the past pollution.

Given the presence of infrastructure, locational advantages and a host of other reasons, however, previously developed sites, even those that are known to have been contaminated, will continue to be redeveloped. The global imperative posed by climate change and the importance of “growing cooler” as a tool in limiting greenhouse gas emissions have added pressures for the denser development possible only on reused urban sites (Ewing, *et al.* 2007).

The RBCA logic itself, however, adds to the risk involved in any reuse. The threats to human and ecosystem health posed by past contamination are considered to be determined by three interacting factors:

- (1) the pollution itself (types and volumes or quantities of contaminants),
- (2) the damage done from exposure to different quantities of these substances, and
- (3) the means of exposure (or pathways) by which humans or the larger ecosystem is impacted.

RBCA focuses on limiting factor (3) through the implementation of specific controls to limit human and ecosystem exposure to contaminants left in place. Engineering controls (ECs) are instituted to contain pollution and keep it from surfacing or migrating so as to eliminate exposure pathways. Land Use or Institutional Controls (LUCs or ICs) are implemented to keep certain human activities off the site, to limit both possible damage to ECs and total time on site for human exposure to whatever continues down partially blocked pathways. Some materials removal, that is, action on factor (1) is undertaken only to the extent that the pathway limits cannot sufficiently limit the damage generated by the volume of contaminants deposited.

Both the ECs and ICs limit the exposure pathways; they *do not fully eliminate them*. In the event of failure of either ECs or LUCs, off-site neighborhood exposures can arise, with resulting harm concentrated on those living, working and/or owning property in the area and the risk remains into the future (Rowan and Fridgen 2003). The neighborhood – those parties off-site most likely to be impacted in the event of a RBCA failure – is not automatically a party to the redevelopment process. That real estate transaction involves a seller, a buyer, financial backers (including at times state or local government economic development agencies), and potentially one or more prospective end users, plus appropriate regulatory agencies, including financial as well as environmental regulators responsible for limiting aggregate risk. Unless a conscious effort is made by a developer – or required by some local government policy or practice – the neighborhood is not at the table unless it is the property buyer or seller.

- II -

The EPA-funded research effort underlying the analysis was intended to address the intersection of environmental risk management and area-based brownfields redevelopment. It is one part of a much larger five-year effort to track environmental insurance products available for brownfield redevelopment projects, the states' efforts to promote use of insurance to reduce risk and attract regeneration capital and to educate the brownfield community about the roles of insurance in brownfield project risk management.

The underlying policy problem is that the majority of brownfield sites nationwide are small in land area and mitigation costs. They also tend to be scattered across economically depressed areas. No one of these brownfield sites can be expected to yield the above-average returns on investment needed to attract private capital to it. However, an area-based approach, integrating multiple sites into a single regeneration program has the potential for attracting capital, generating positive community benefits, improving environmental justice, and turning around neighborhood property values. Local economic development efforts that take such an approach thus may provide not only greater private returns to investment on individual brownfield parcels, but also higher public returns through the positive spillovers to non-brownfield properties in neighborhoods.

The following criteria were used in the case study community selection process:

- An area with defined boundaries and existing residential land uses.
- A number of sites with a history of multiple owners and uses, not just a single large site being transformed for new uses.
- Identified by local stakeholders as a target for redevelopment.
- Not in a strong real estate market that would attract redevelopment capital without support.
- Local parties interested in working with the research team.<sup>2</sup>

Suggestions for cases were solicited from EPA regional staff, and the research team reviewed reports on EPA-funded Brownfield Pilot Projects for case prospects. After review and site visits, localities in Indiana, Kentucky, Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Vermont were selected as active case study settings; many had more than one area-wide brownfield project underway and thus provided efficient access to a variety of activities and issues.<sup>3</sup>

Interviews continue to be conducted with, and documentary materials have been collected from, economic development and environmental regulatory authorities in the study areas, as well as from organizations representing the neighborhoods in which the case study projects were implemented or are being planned. Issues being addressed include:

- Extent of attention paid to off-site impacts in preliminary project planning;
- Public subsidies provided and the bases of decisions on the amount of aid offered;
- How decisions were made on RBCA strategies and the ECs and LUCs used, the extent to which those decisions are known in the communities and neighbors' concerns with them, if any such problems existed;
- Impacts experienced or anticipated in terms of off-site property values and affordability for neighborhood residents, and concerns about, or experience of, displacement;
- Risk management strategies employed and the extent to which any risks to off-site residents and businesses were addressed in insurance or other litigation-avoiding risk transfers; and,
- Broader economic impacts recorded or anticipated, including both those on the community surrounding the contaminated site(s), the municipalities of which they are a part and larger planning areas (metropolitan or Council of Government areas) where appropriate.

**- III -**

Our objective in picking study locations was to derive lessons that had broad applicability and replicability. The choices, however, were constrained in part by a project emphasis on risk management, so projects in which risks from past contamination (or the response to that pollution) were not a concern were of lower interest. Since we relied on the participants in the regeneration process for information, we had to meet them and establish that they would cooperate with us. Finally, the project was operating under a Cooperative Agreement with EPA,

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<sup>2</sup> The researchers did offer technical assistance in return for cooperation in pursuit of the research objectives, but no requests for in-person aid have been recorded, other than help with some document access and references, and guidance offered while researchers were on site and discussing current issues facing the project participants.

<sup>3</sup> Other communities, notably Milwaukee and Kenosha in Wisconsin and Emeryville in California, had lessons to offer, but were not in the middle of actively community-driven brownfield redevelopment projects. We are reviewing and revisiting possible lessons from those settings, but have not incorporated them here.

so the agency played a role both in identifying potential study sites and then approving our selections. The places we decided to study in detail are presented here in alphabetical order, with a brief description of their local characteristics (■), preliminary findings (Y), and potential lessons learned (≡).

### **ARTEZ, PA**

- ARTEZ is Allegheny River Towns Enterprise Zone, a state economic development unit applied for by seven minor civil divisions (MCDs) on the river just north of Pittsburgh.
- All were old industrial towns using the river for transport; now suburbs, with steep slopes up from waterfront pollution and abandoned industrial sites above residential areas.
- The five boroughs and two townships had 2000 populations of 30,000 to 1,500, and all but one lost population 1990-2006, but less rapidly than Allegheny County of Pittsburgh.
- The MCDs were too small to accomplish much on their own, shared brownfield sites, and were economically interlocked while dependent on Pittsburgh.
- ARTEZ, an externally suggested collaboration that successfully got state certification as an EZ and then successfully landed an EPA brownfield assessment grant, has struggled for commitments from the nominally participating MCDs, several of which do not even send representatives to ARTEZ meetings.

Y Concern for coordination has led to a tendency to ignore imbedded neighborhoods and internal differences between populations, and thus to inaction.

Y Desperation for investment may have led to municipal actions that undermine the alliance.

Y Creation and maintenance of the organizational structures needed to tackle brownfields appears to have depended on an outside power – a key state legislator in this case.

Y The fact that a collaborative body exists may have undermined joint efforts of subset of its members to address a common brownfield area.

≡ Small municipalities may be even more vulnerable to problems generated by ignoring the specific brownfield concerns of neighborhoods than larger local government units.

≡ A voluntary, time-bound organization (such as ARTEZ, managing an enterprise zone) may be less capable of promoting brownfield redevelopment than less specialized permanent government collaborations (councils of government, for example) simply because they have no long-term standing in addressing the prospective risks inherent in such projects.

### **Burlington, VT**

- University town, vacation resort destination, once a major port and transport center, with contaminated sites closest to lakefront a barrier to regeneration.
- Stagnant population under 40,000 in a county with a growing population of 150,000+.
- Strong public brownfield leadership with centrally located abandoned contaminated areas almost as big as city center, and a large, active land trust converting brownfields into low income housing.

Y Reshaping local land use patterns and expectations appears to have been central to achieving brownfield reclamation; absent such changes, areas are stagnating.

Y Absence of any state liability relief acts as a barrier to non-profit or CBO-led redevelopment.

Y Municipalities can abandon their low income home ownership efforts completely, even in areas with housing price pressures, if they have an institution such as a land trust to provide opportunities for low and moderate income renters and homebuyers.

- ≡ Municipal land *banks* that acquire property (voluntarily or through tax delinquency) in order to dispose of it, can promote brownfield redevelopment by facilitating acquisition by arms-length land *trusts* that are interested in holding land in pursuit of a variety of land use objectives. (Dewar, 2006, notes having such objectives key to getting regeneration.)
- ≡ The institutional form of a land trust as a tool has been overlooked although it can play a major role in risk management for RBCA redevelopments.

### **Indianapolis, IN**

- State capitol, long a leader in Midwest downtown revitalization but with old, polluted neighborhoods (foundries, smelters, etc. in residential areas).
  - Population growing slowly in merged city-county and in metro area.
  - Vacant and hollowed out neighborhoods (some were separate pre-merger inner ring suburbs).
  - Direct city spending on removal and mitigation of environmental problems at key sites.
  - Strong city commitment to neighborhoods complemented by funding and other support for Local Initiative Support Corporation (LISC) to neighborhood groups.
  - Diverse neighborhood organization-led regeneration efforts have shown a variety of results.
- Y Brownfield regeneration does not necessarily produce smarter growth, urban spatial forms or stronger neighborhoods, even when no displacement occurs.
- Y Residents' denials of real environmental problems slow responses even when the denials are not driven by desperation for new jobs or economic activity leading to lower standards.
- Y Community-based brownfield redevelopment is often so budget constrained that appropriate, useful, and relatively low-cost insurance may still be financially inaccessible.
- ≡ Quality of support for community-based organizations may generate excess confidence when the supporting entities have limited capacity to provide guidance on environmental risks.
  - ≡ The less CBOs pursuing brownfield redevelopment are dependent on borrowed capital, the less likely they are to recognize risks, especially when residents (members) deny their presence.

### **Louisville, KY**

- **My center's office!!**
- Kentucky's largest city, old Ohio River industrial and transportation center, transformed to regional health and financial center, with expanding low-skill jobs in overnight transport.
- Slowly declining in population – doubling since 2000 due to merger of city with the unincorporated areas of its county, which has been growing slowly.
- Long-established network of officially recognized neighborhoods, all with some city financing and other support.
- One of the original EPA brownfield pilot recipients now engaged in a neighborhood-based brownfield education project that is building new alliances and relationships.
- The largest central area adversely affected by contamination and abandoned factories is also the longest boundary zone between the Black West side of the city and its White East, with few E-W roadways, and this is the area redevelopment under study.
- The two largest private landowners in the area, exclusive of the railroads are the locally resident heir to some five blocks of abandoned factory space he wants to see re-used, and a Black mega-church that has been buying derelict properties and razing the buildings; the former is more active in brownfield regeneration efforts than the latter.

Y High level local commitment to site regeneration has been stymied by a too narrow definition of the spillover effects and the neighborhood processes that shape economic redevelopment options (anticipated by the findings of Blair and Carroll, 2007).

Y Some local landowners are just as ignorant of both the brownfield threats and the options for mitigation as rental residents, and much inaction is a function of that lack of information.

≡ Neighborhood lines as seen by locals may not be appropriate planning units for regeneration efforts, and spillovers from adjacent areas may be key to cleanups and reuse efforts.

≡ Alliances about neighborhood improvement objectives can form between such diverse parties as major industrial landowners and occupants of rental housing.

≡ Such cooperative efforts may founder on the issues of risk management which generate conflicting interests over who will pay even when objectives remain shared.

≡ Local institutions that are committed in principle to local area redevelopment can be barriers to brownfield redevelopment and neighborhood regeneration if they acquire property (even vacant land) and fail to commit resources to reclamation or reuse.

### **Rock Hill, SC**

▪ Old textile mill town, including the largest plant under a single roof in the US (abandoned), and one of the earlier brownfield pilot communities, on the edge of the Charlotte, NC commuting ring, but not yet experiencing rapidly rising area property values.

▪ Population exploded 2000-2006 from under 50,000 to over 60,000, so speculative pressure will be building, but has not yet attracted capital to brownfield areas.

▪ Local economic development agency has experience revitalizing and creating new business areas, but on its periphery; only recently turned towards its center, with major clusters of abandoned textile plants.

▪ Exceptionally strong neighborhood development agency within city, promoting creation of new organizations and providing resources.

▪ Project underway in area around a textile mill site stabilized and remediated after a recent fire, with over 25 abandoned mixed use sites nearby and strong neighborhood organization.

Y Giving voice to neighborhoods has enhanced the city's ability to plan and reshape areas by assuring cooperation, as well as injection of new ideas that may be useful.

Y Neighborhood lines as seen by locals were not appropriate planning units for regeneration; dealing with spillovers from adjacent areas appears to be key to a successful reuse effort.

≡ Residents' denials of environmental problems can limit the acceptability of more extensive responses that public agencies deem necessary to protect public health and may become as much a barrier to redevelopment as opposition to perceived inadequate RBCA mitigations.

≡ Environmental risks are not likely to be addressed adequately by any of the empowered parties (local government, landowners, PRPs, developers) when communities actively deny their possibility, so risk management require community environmental education.

### **Worcester, MA**

▪ "Classic" old New England mill town perceiving itself as blue collar, but with six institutions of higher education in the municipality.

▪ Stagnant population with under 1% growth in 15 years, despite growth in its universities.

▪ City's mayor had been a state leader in brownfield redevelopment initiatives for some time.

▪ Home to a number of different area-wide brownfield projects, permitting comparison of multiple cases of such efforts in a single setting, each with different characteristics.

- One project bought insurance to address risk perceptions of a university that was a lead participant while others in the effort did not see need for such risk transfers.
  - Another university did not see the need for risk transfers, and is revitalizing its neighborhood to retain a student-friendly and safe setting, with the physical environment issues secondary to the social aspects in university priority but still essential to the regeneration effort.
  - A community social service agency entering the brownfields arena to tackle a largely abandoned industrial complex in the middle of its service area that has accepted RBCA risks in building new low income rental and ownership housing for its clients.
- Y Communications failures about city development plans seriously undermined efforts: property owners in an industrial zone targeted for redevelopment sold to new owners that introduced a non-conforming land use (a church).
- Y Unfocused broad city commitment to brownfield redevelopment stimulated involvement by organizations not adequately prepared to address either environmental or financial risks.
- Y City offices did not coordinate efforts to protect CBOs and others against risks from brownfields. (Building permit issued for the church with play space in basement while site environmental condition made use of the facility as a day care center – key to the church’s financial viability – impossible.)
- ≡ Without third party support, community organizations with common brownfield problems may not be able to collaborate when necessary, even though all acknowledge the need.
  - ≡ Universities *can be* cooperative and responsive to low income communities in which they are located and into which their campuses and facilities may expand, taking over brownfields.
  - ≡ Brownfield regeneration activity is contagious, especially when municipally supported but not city-led, and can lead to excess risk acceptance by many enthusiastic participants.

### Wyandanch, NY

- Impoverished borough (Census designated place) in affluent Babylon, NY, containing some industrial activities, including new plants, and housing the major concentrations of different minorities in the Town of Babylon in housing stock of wildly variable quality.
  - Population growing at national average rates doubles that of Babylon itself.
  - One of the first Brownfield Opportunity Areas (BOAs) designated by NY State for special planning funds and support (some \$500,000 in 2004), and a primary target for Babylon’s current economic development efforts.
  - In an “environmentally progressive” urban area: Babylon requires LEED certification for new commercial building.
  - Engaging community extensively in planning efforts (providing maximum access, with simultaneous translation to Spanish and Haitian Creole), starting with a 600 person five day charrette process in 2005, and continuing since.
- Y Funding delays undermined community cohesion, commitment and purpose (BOA money did not begin to flow until 2007)
- Y Careful shaping of target area by the Town of Babylon has enabled it to avoid addressing issues of gentrification that may be expected to result from spillover out of a narrowly defined redevelopment zone (notwithstanding plans to build “worker housing”).
- Y External users of local land need not be imposing noxious activities or direct environmental exposures to undermine local redevelopment potential: commuter parking lots appear to be having the same effect.

- Y Regeneration planning appears to be underestimating economic displacement since the area has local businesses underutilizing their sites' *location value potential* but not their land and buildings (sites and premises are fully occupied and used, but by low revenue land uses).
- ≡ State and federal requirements for funds eligibility may lead localities to define target areas for regeneration planning efforts that are too small to incorporate the extent of impacts.
  - ≡ Maintenance of broad community commitment and involvement over time is difficult: long project planning spans leave only neighborhood special interests standing unless there already is a strong local CBO.
  - ≡ Broad community participation (and the need to satisfy state and federal funders) can lead to a focus on idealized visions of area transformation that fail to address mitigation issues and both economic and environmental risks.

- IV -

The dominant single finding on risk across all these cases is the not surprising result that it is not well understood. Two of the cases faced planning problems due to denial of environmental issues and risk on the part of residents (and in one case the CBO's leadership). But the broader issue is that risk exaggeration as well as denial can pose a problem – as can the misspecification of the type of risk involved (such as the failure to see the connection between environmental and economic risk or the link between types of land uses and environmental exposure risks).

Exaggeration of environmental risks is not the exclusive problem of residents or CBOs. Land owners, while wanting to sell and move on, appeared in several instances to be motivated by excessive fears of what site assessments might find and thus of the cost of remedial actions. In many such instances, the owners, knowing themselves to be in the liability chain for cleanups, often deny public officials or prospective buyers of their sites the access needed to complete site assessments. Owner resistance to site assessments, however, appears to be a rational function of state reporting requirements. In Massachusetts and New York, for example, where any discovery of even quite small amounts of contamination by any investigating party must immediately be reported to the state environment agency, owners face the risk of receiving a cleanup order that could not only require expenditures but may limit or terminate current land uses that generate revenues. In Pennsylvania and Kentucky, by contrast, private engineering firms conducting the site assessments are deemed to be working under contract to the owner and do not have reporting obligations to the state, so owners are more willing to conduct assessments, since the value of the upside – discovery of no contamination problem – may be realized without running the risk of an immediate expenditure for cleanup on the downside.

The most promising risk management tool uncovered in examining these cases is the land trust, an institution not created with contaminated land in mind at all. The value that the land trust offers is not its own structure, *per se*, but the specific interest of a land owner, as distinct from that of an operator or occupant, and its value lies in the potential for more explicit attention to the matter of long term stewardship of sites with residual contamination – those mitigated using RBCA.

The US, unlike many other places in the world, tends to a single form of real estate ownership: title to both land and improvements held by the same party. In Britain, by contrast, leaseholds,

separating the ownership, are vastly more common than freeholds (their label for the US pattern), in the Netherlands, for yet another example, 100% of land is publicly owned and leased to developers who do the vertical build if it is developed. Other mixed forms can be found elsewhere, but most include some element of continuity of ownership of the land itself, regardless of what is placed on the site. In the US, the only form of ownership of developed land that exhibits that continuity is the land trust.

Continuity of ownership is arguably a major potential contributor to the potential for maintenance of long term stewardship of property that has passed through a RBCA remedial process:

- Information about site conditions is not going to be lost through successive real estate transactions with counsel for buyers not doing complete records searches;
- An owner will remain that has a clear financial interest in minimizing risks and maintaining controls on land uses, even if such controls require out of pocket expenses or income forgone;
- The owner earns a return in terms of risk avoidance and reduced insurance costs (if the owner carries insurance) from active monitoring of the condition of all engineered controls and from acquiring current information about experienced mitigation and remedy failures that could jeopardize future asset values; and,
- As the lessor of the property, the owner has an economic interest in assuring that any and all occupants or utilizers of the site, including all sublessees or tenants of the party holding the land lease, are alerted to both land use limitations and constraints on types of actions (such as certain forms of digging or excavation) they can take without damaging engineered controls.

RBCA property held by a land trust thus poses less of a risk of negative environmental external effects in its neighborhood, regardless of actual site use, than would the same property held in the “land and improvements” pattern that is the US norm. Insofar as they may be bankrolled at arms length by municipalities (whether using tax increment financing capacities or other borrowing capacities, augmented by title transfers from land banks), and they are already in use for low income housing provision in many venues, they deserve closer attention as tools to facilitate brownfield redevelopment.

On the question of replicability of findings from a series of cases that are smaller than the widely publicized major urban centers and metropolitan areas, the interest of senior environmental policy officials in New York and Detroit in both the land trust vehicle for site management and stewardship and in the prospect of using the trust structure as an intermediary partner to encourage small site owners to allow environmental assessments is indicative of relevance. In both instances, officials have expressed interest in detailed examination of options with members of the research team. At this intermediate stage of the research effort, however, no report on conclusions about applicability can be reached.

- V -

A full conclusion is, as noted, not possible at this point, but some preliminary findings on the threats of gentrification and displacement in brownfield neighborhoods and its control can be noted:

- ≡ Any remedial processes that reduce long term risk and uncertainty about future conditions of suspect sites will tend to make the area around them more attractive to real estate investors, and thus will tend to raise the market pressures for gentrification to take root.
- ≡ The displacement effects of the gentrification pressures will be a function of housing tenure, non-housing land uses in the area, and the property ownership mix prior to remediations, whatever the structures and powers of local CBOs may be.
- ≡ Land trusts have been developed in the US as tools for assuring low and moderate income households with access to good quality housing for rent and purchase and are touted as tools for controlling the displacement effects of neighborhood property market improvement, that is, gentrification.
- ≡ To the extent that they get involved in acquiring and remedying conditions on environmentally impaired properties, land trusts may also serve to reduce the long term risks and uncertainties associated with the RBCA responses dictated by relatively low property values and need to remediation cost containment in depressed neighborhoods.
- ≡ The community land trust, a tool developed to protect from displacement in the face of gentrification thus may serve to both promote environmental mitigation and protect neighbors from the negative effects of transformed property markets and community attractiveness.

One major question that remains unanswered with respect to this tool, and will have to be examined with interested parties in New York and Detroit, is the extent to which a large municipality will need to generate multiple trusts for its different neighborhoods, or whether a single entity can serve these dual roles for wide areas, tailoring policies to fit the conditions in a wide variety of property markets and communities.

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